Georgia Slip-and-Fall Premises Liability After Drossman v. Wal-Mart Stores East
By: Reed Wilkinson
Georgia slip-and-fall law rarely changes dramatically, but occasionally a decision arrives that clarifies how courts are likely to evaluate these cases at the summary judgment stage. The Georgia Court of Appeals’ February 4, 2025 decision in Drossman v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 374 Ga. App. 285, is one of those opinions. The court affirmed summary judgment for the retailer after the plaintiff failed to produce evidence that the store had superior knowledge — actual or constructive — of the specific puddle that allegedly caused her fall. The case does not rewrite Georgia premises liability doctrine. Instead, it reinforces the practical reality that slip-and-fall litigation in the state often rises or falls on a narrow evidentiary question: can the plaintiff prove the defendant knew, or should have known, about the precise hazard that caused the injury?
The dispute arose from a relatively typical retail-accident scenario. The plaintiff alleged she slipped and fell on water on the floor of a store near the end of an aisle adjacent to a freezer section. According to the record, she did not see water before she fell, but after the fall she noticed that her clothing was wet and felt liquid on the floor that she believed to be water. Other witnesses observed a small amount of liquid in the area after the incident. Importantly, however, the plaintiff could not identify the source of the water. She speculated that it may have come from a nearby freezer or from customers opening freezer doors earlier. Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff could not establish the essential element of superior knowledge. The trial court agreed, and the plaintiff appealed. On review, the court of appeals framed the dispute within Georgia’s familiar premises-liability rule: a proprietor is not liable for every fall on its property. Liability arises only when the owner had superior knowledge — actual or constructive — of the hazardous condition. The court ultimately concluded the plaintiff’s evidence failed to create a genuine issue of fact on the superior knowledge requirement.
A key feature of the opinion is the court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s attempt to show actual knowledge through generalized evidence about store conditions. The plaintiff argued Wal-Mart knew freezers sometimes leak and the store placed spill pads in other areas of the store where leaks might occur. In her view, that awareness supported a jury question regarding the store’s knowledge of the water hazard. The court of appeals disagreed, emphasizing Georgia law requires knowledge of the specific hazard, not simply awareness that a hazard might occur somewhere in the store. Evidence that freezers can leak, or that employees place absorbent pads in certain areas, might show a general awareness of risk, but it does not establish knowledge of a particular puddle on the floor at a particular time. The court’s reasoning reinforces a principle frequently invoked in Georgia premises liability cases: a defendant’s knowledge must relate to the actual condition that caused the fall, not to a broad category of possible risks. For insurers defending these claims, that distinction becomes critical when plaintiffs rely on generalized maintenance or safety practices to argue the defendant “should have known” a hazard might exist.
The plaintiff’s constructive-knowledge theories fared no better. Georgia law recognizes two primary routes to constructive knowledge. The first is the familiar “time on the floor” theory, which requires evidence that the hazard existed long enough that a reasonable inspection would have discovered it. The second is the “employee in the vicinity” theory, which applies when an employee was close enough to easily notice and correct the hazard before the incident. In Drossman, the retailer produced evidence of employees had inspecting the area only minutes before the fall — roughly three and a half minutes according to the record — and that the floor appeared dry during that inspection. The plaintiff could not produce evidence showing how long the water had actually been present. Instead, she suggested customers opening freezer doors 30 to 50 minutes earlier might have caused the water to accumulate. The court treated that argument as speculation rather than evidence. Because Georgia precedent holds that inspection within a brief period before the fall can render an inspection program adequate as a matter of law, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s “time on the floor” theory failed. The opinion therefore underscores how powerful contemporaneous inspection evidence can be when the plaintiff cannot establish the duration of the hazard.
Drossman v. Wal-Mart Stores East is less about changing Georgia law and more about reinforcing how rigorously the courts apply it. Where a plaintiff cannot establish that knowledge — either through evidence of duration, employee visibility or direct awareness — summary judgment remains a powerful defense tool. For insurers evaluating premises liability claims, the case is a reminder that documentation of inspections, employee activities and surveillance evidence often becomes the critical factors in determining whether a claim proceeds to trial or ends at the courthouse door.
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Reed Wilkinson
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